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Abstract
This research  examines  the effects of risk-related  factors on the proportion of equity held by  agricultural  cooperatives.  The empirical  analysis indicates  that capital structure is significantly affected  by the level  and variation of profitability,  commodities handled,  and market function.  The proportion of equity  is not affected  by size or pooling.  Contrary to expectations,  the results indicate an inverse relation between  profit variability and the proportion of equity.  Cooperatives  rely on profit for equity accumulation through retained earnings.  If this source of equity is unstable,  the cooperative  may not be able to generate sufficient equity  causing the estimated  inverse relationship.
The purpose of this research  is to analyze factors  affecting the proportion of equity
in the capital  structure of agricultural  cooperatives.  Insofar as equity capital  provides  a
measure of protection against adverse business outcomes,  equity holdings are expected to
depend on the risk faced by  a cooperative.  If the potential for adverse  outcomes  is high,
equity levels  are expected to be correspondingly high.
Risk can be defined  in the business  context as the uncertainty of future outcomes  that
arises from variations  in the economic environment  (Brealey and  Myers).  Price and output
instability are observable causes of risk among  firms.  They are affected  by a variety of
factors,  both observable and unobservable,  which  include the efficiency  of labor,  changing
quality of managerial  decisions,  weather,  pest infestation or natural disasters,  interest rate
fluctuations,  and policy or technological changes.  All these factors combine  to produce
variability in earnings,  which  is an accepted  measure of risk for firms.  The greater  the
potential swings  in earnings,  the higher the risk faced by the firm.
Equity capital  provides  a cushion or a buffer that can absorb  the swings  in earnings.
With little equity,  a firm facing  a large period loss at the bottom of a fluctuating
performance  curve may be unable to meet its obligations and  will be forced into dissolution.
If a firm holds a sufficient amount of equity,  however, the period losses can be absorbed  byits equity  capital and the firm will continue operating,  although  its owners will be that much
poorer.  It is  accordingly  argued that firms faced  with high risk should maintain  a higher
proportion of equity in order to absorb the potential extreme  downswings  in their
performance  (Brealey  and Myers).
This general  reasoning is not restricted to investor-owned  firms  and it is equally
valid for the user-owned  cooperatives.  If extreme downswings  in a cooperative's
performance  are not absorbed by its equity capital,  the cooperative will be forced  into
dissolution,  causing damage to its owner-patrons  due to discontinuation of services  and loss
of their equity;  alternatively,  the cooperative may be saved by infusion of new equity
capital, thus imposing an additional  "cost" on its members.  Both unpleasant circumstances
may be avoided if the level of equity capital  in a cooperative  is matched to its risk level.
The rationale for using variability in earnings  as the standard  risk measure is that it
incorporates  the effect of changing prices  and output,  as well  as  a variety of firm-specific
unobservable  factors.  Risk, however,  may  also be affected  by some structural factors that
can be explicitly identified and  examined.  One of these structural factors is size.  It is
usually believed that larger  size confers a measure of safety or stability to  a firm.  Banks
and other creditors may  place greater trust in the repayment capacity  of large firms
assuming they represent less of a credit risk and are more diversified  (Sporleder, Malick,
and Tough).  Therefore  large cooperatives  may be able to borrow proportionately more than
small cooperatives  and  function with a lower proportion of equity capital.
The commodity handled by a cooperative  and its primary function - whether
marketing or input supply - may also  influence risk.  The wide swings in grain prices  caused
by changes  in global demand  may cause a grain-marketing  cooperative  to be riskier than a
cooperative that handles  frozen vegetables  in relatively stable markets.  Cooperatives
2functioning as suppliers of farm inputs  may face greater  risk due to the required risky
investment in inventories  than cooperatives  primarily serving  as marketing  agents with
flowthrough  sales.  A recent  study indeed demonstrated  that the proportion of debt  (the
complement of the proportion  of equity) varied significantly across cooperatives  handling
different  commodities  and performing different  functions  (Lerman and Parliament).
A structural factor specific to cooperatives  is the distinction between  pooling and
nonpooling marketing  cooperatives.  Members  in a pooling cooperative  sign contracts
pledging their output  to the cooperative.  This producer  commitment  eliminates  a portion of
management  and marketing uncertainty  in a pooling cooperative,  which reduces risk
exposure.  Pooling cooperatives have previously been estimated to operate on smaller
proportions of equity than nonpooling cooperatives  (Sporleder,  Malick,  and Tough).
This research  is designed to examine  empirically the effects  of risk-related factors on
the proportion of equity held by agricultural  cooperatives.  Although it may be accepted  that
equity holdings vary among  cooperatives,  the effect  of various risk-related  factors on
cooperative equity has yet to be examined.  After  a brief review of the sources of equity
capital for cooperatives,  the methodology  will be outlined,  the database described,  and the
results summarized.
Equity Capital  in Cooperatives
Cooperatives  and investor-owned  firms obtain equity  capital through direct
investment by members  and from retained  earnings (Cobia and Brewer).  The initial  funds
for starting  a cooperative  are traditionally  raised by direct contribution from members
through the purchase  of shares.  Yet direct investment generates the smallest percentage of
equity among  cooperatives  (Kane).  Cooperatives  are unable to raise equity easily through
3the sale of stock because the returns to cooperative owners  are based on patronage,  not
investment  (Schrader).  As a result, there is no market mechanism to raise equity through
the sale of stock on an ongoing basis (Staatz).
The alternative method of raising equity is through the retention of earnings,
whereby  a portion of net income is added to the equity  capital rather than paid out in
dividends.  A firm's profitability or net income thus has a direct  effect on equity
accumulation.  Higher profitability is expected to be associated  with a higher proportion of
equity.
Although the retention of earnings is a method of rasing equity  common to both
cooperatives  and investor owned firms,  cooperatives  have devised a unique twist by
allocating some of these retained  earnings to their members based on patronage.  These
"allocated  patronage refunds"  are eventually distributed back to the members  through a
revolving  fund or equity redemption program  (Cobia, Royer,  and  Ingalsbe).  They can be
viewed accordingly  as a pool of "deferred  dividends"  that the cooperative employs
temporarily as  a component of its equity capital.  The allocated earnings  are a major source
of equity for agricultural  cooperatives:  the top  100 cooperatives  average 50% of their equity
in the form of allocated  patronage  refunds  (Kane).
Analysis
The theoretical  considerations outlined above suggest that the proportion of equity
capital held by a cooperative may be functionally represented  in the form
EQ/TA  = f(profitability,  size,  firm risk, commodity risk, function, pooling)  (1)
where EQ/TA is the ratio of equity to  total assets.  The arguments  in this functional
specification are the risk-related variables discussed previously.  The only exception is the
4profitability variable,  which acts as a source of equity by generating  retained earnings.
According  to the theory, the proportion of equity in a cooperative  is expected to increase
with increases  in profitability  and  with increases in the two risk variables;  it is  expected to
decrease with increases in size.  Regarding  the variables  "function"  and  "pooling",
marketing  cooperatives  are expected  to maintain  a lower proportion of equity than supply
cooperatives,  and  cooperatives that pool are expected  to operate  with lower proportions  of
equity than nonpooling cooperatives.  In both categories,  the expected  differences  are
attributable  to differential  risk, as discussed previously.
Data
The model  is estimated  using a complete  cross-section  time-series database of annual
financial statements  for 61  agricultural  cooperatives  for the years  1973  to  1987.  The
cooperatives  included  in the analysis are those that responded to a request for financial
statement data sent to the cooperatives  listed in the Directory of Farmer Cooperatives
published by the USDA Agricultural  Cooperative  Service (Jermolowicz and Kennedy).
The cooperatives in the database  are classified  into categories based on commodities
handled:  cotton,  dairy, fruit  and vegetables,  grain, rice,  sugar, and  farm inputs.  A separate
category includes  cooperatives that handle both farm inputs and grain (farm inputs/grain
category).  Another  category consists of diversified cooperatives that are involved with a
wide variety of commodities,  including farm inputs and processed  foods.  The cooperatives
are also  classified by their primary function:  supply,  marketing,  or mixed  (supply and
marketing).  The marketing cooperatives  are further classified based on whether or not they
pool.  The distribution of cooperatives  by commodity  and function is provided  in Table  1.
5TABLE  1:  Distribution of Cooperatives  by Commodity and Function
Commodity  Number of  Number of  Function  Number of
cooperatives  pooling  cooperatives
by commodity  cooperatives  by function
Cotton  2  2  Marketing
Dairy  11  0  Marketing
Fruit and Vegetables  15  9  Marketing
Grain  5  0  Marketing
Rice  1  1  Marketing
Sugar  4  2  Marketing  38
Farm Inputs  9  0  Supply  9
Farm Inputs/Grain  10  0  Mixed
Diversified  4  0  Mixed  14
Total  61  14  61
Variables
The dependent variable EQ/TA in model (1) is calculated  as the ratio of total equity
to total assets for each  cooperative  in each  year.  The use of this ratio instead of the actual
equity  capital  controls for the strong positive correlation between  equity  and size and  allows
comparison  for cooperatives  of different  size.  Cooperative  size is then measured by the
cooperative's  total assets in each year.
Profitability  and firm risk in the context of investor-owned firms  are measured by
the rate of return to equity  (ROE)  and the standard deviation of ROE over time,
respectively.  Some cooperative researchers  advocate  against the use of ROE-based  measures
because of the unique nature of the allocated equity component.  As explained previously,
6the allocated  retained  earnings  in cooperatives  are not permanent  equity capital and are
eventually  revolved out as part of equity redemption programs.
To soften the possible conceptual difficulties with the exclusive use of ROE  in a
study of cooperatives,  three measures  of profitability are calculated:  the ratio of before-tax
net profit to equity (ROE),  the ratio of before-tax net profit to sales  (margin on sales),  and
the before-tax  dollar profit.  All three profitability measures  are calculated from the panel
data for each cooperative  in each  year.  A separate analysis shows that the three profitability
measures  are uncorrelated  (Table 2A) and therefore  all three can be used in regression
analysis.  To avoid proliferation of variables,  a composite profitability index is created  by
converting  the three profitability measures to ranks  and forming an average profitability rank
score for each  cooperative.  This rank score is used as the profitability variable in model
(1).
Firm risk is represented in the usual  way by variability of earnings  of each
cooperative  over time.  Again, to avoid exclusive reliance on ROE-based  risk, three
measures  of earnings variability are calculated:  the variability of the before-tax  net profit to
equity,  the variability of the before-tax net profit to sales,  and the variability of the absolute
before-tax  profit.  Both net profit to sales and  net profit to equity are percentage values  and
their variability  is accordingly  calculated  as the standard deviation over the time period
1973-1987.  The variability of the absolute profit is calculated  as the coefficient of variation,
/
which is the standard deviation of profit divided by mean profit over the period  1973-1987.
The use of the coefficient  of variation of profit standardizes the variability measure by the
magnitude of the profit.  Here again  a separate  analysis shows that the correlation between
the three measures of firm risk is not pronounced (Table 2B) and therefore,  in principle,  all
7three measures may be included in regression analysis.  A composite firm risk index is
created by converting the three firm risk measures  to ranks and forming an  average risk
rank score for each  cooperative.  This index is used as the firm risk variable in model (1).
TABLE  2:  Coefficients of Correlation Between Alternative Profitability and Risk Measures of
Cooperatives  (significance levels in parentheses)
A.  Profitability measures
Mean  Mean
Profit to  Profit
Equity
Mean  Profit to Sales  0.204  0.155
(0.12)  (0.23)
Mean Profit to Equity  0.049
(0.71)
B.  Risk measures
Standard  Deviation of  Coefficient of
Profit  to Equity  Variation of
Profit
Standard Deviation of
Profit to Sales  0.298  0.222
(0.02)  (0.09)
Standard  Deviation of
Profit to Equity  0.068
(0.60)
8The variable representing commodity-related  risk in model  (1) is measured by the
variability of sales in each  of the nine  commodity  categories over time.  Thus, the
commodity-related  effect in the model  is not represented by a categorical variable
("commodity group"),  but by a continuous variable calculated for each  commodity  group
separately.  While profit depends  on firm-specific  factors  such as management  decisions and
human capital  and therefore provides  an appropriate measure of firm risk,  sales variability is
viewed in this study as a characteristic  of the risk associated  with the commodity handled  by
the cooperative.  To standardize  for the magnitude of sales,  commodity  risk is calculated as
the coefficient of variation of sales of all cooperatives  within a particular commodity
category  over the period  1973-1987.  Table 3 ranks the commodity categories  in the order
of decreasing risk as measured  by the coefficient  of variation of sales.  Separate analysis
shows that the correlation of the commodity-risk  variable with the firm-risk variable is not
significantly different from zero,  so that both variables may be used in the estimation of the
model.
The calculation of the two  risk measures  is made possible by the availability of
sufficiently  long time series for  each  cooperative  (15  years  of data).  This is a particular
strength of the database used in this research and  distinguishes the present  analysis from the
previous study of Sporleder,  Malick,  and Tough which  examined factors  affecting  equity
capital.
Function and pooling in model (1) are represented by categorical  variables,
associating one of three functions (marketing,  supply,  or mixed) to each  cooperative  and
classifying  it as pooling or nonpooling.  Both the function category  and pooling status are
determined based on information provided  in annual financial  statements.
9TABLE 3:  Ranking of Commodities by Sales  Risk (in descending  order)
Coefficient of Variation
Risk Rank  Commodity  of Sales
1  Grain  152.692
2  Farm inputs/grain  138.161
3  Dairy  121.758
4  Fruit and vegetables  113.128
5  Farm inputs  111.349
6  Cotton  100.290
7  Sugar  87.518
8  Diversified  53.556
9  Rice  33.083
Regression Model
The  functional model (1) can be specified  as  a linear  regression model describing the
panel data in the form
(EQ/TA)ij  =  a +  6iPROFITi, +  f 2SIZEi  +  B 3FIRM RISKi +  0 4 COMMODITY  RISKI  +
6 5 FUNCTIONj  +  66POOL,  +  ut  (2)
The subscript i identifies the cooperative,  i  = 1,...,61;  the subscript t indicates the year in
the time series,  t  =  1973,...,1987;  and the subscript j stands for the commodity category,  j
=  1,...,9.  The underlying  assumption of model  (2) is that the regression coefficients  hi and
the intercept term a are homogeneous  across  cooperatives.
The variables in the model  (2) are  as described  in the preceding  subsection and their
definitions are summarized  in Table 4.  The two risk variables representing cooperative  risk
FIRM RISKi and commodity risk COMMODITY  RISKj  do not carry a time subscript,
because  they are based  on summary statistics (standard deviations  and coefficients  of
variation) for the period  1973-1987.  The function and pooling  classification of the
10individual  cooperatives  was not observed to change over time,  and these categorical
variables are therefore independent of t.
TABLE 4:  Definition of Variables in Regression Models  (2) and (3)
Model  (2): panel  data
(EQ/TA)itj  Ratio of equity to total assets for cooperative  i in year t by industry j
PROFITit  Profitability of cooperative i in year t: average  rank score of (i) before-
tax profit to sales,  (ii) before-tax profit to equity,  and (iii) dollar profit
for cooperative  i in year t
SIZEit  Total assets of cooperative  i in year t (in $ billions)
FIRM  RISK i Risk measure  of cooperative i:  average  rank score of (i) standard
deviation of profit to  sales,  (ii) standard deviation of profit to equity,
and (iii) coefficient of variation of dollar profit for cooperative  i over
the period  1973-1987
COMMODITY RISKj  Commodity-related risk measure for commodity j: coefficient  of
variation of sales across  all cooperatives  handling commodity j over the
period 1973-1987
FUNCTION;  Categorical  variable with values  "marketing",  "mixed",  or "supply"
assigned to each  cooperative i
POOL,  Categorical variable with values  "pooling" or "nonpooling"  assigned to
each cooperative i
Model  (3): data averaged over time
(EQ/TA)ij Mean  equity to total  assets ratio  for cooperative i by industry j
PROFIT i Mean profitability of cooperative  i
SIZE;  Mean  total assets of cooperative  i  (in $ billion)
FIRM RISK i As in model (2)
COMMODITY RISKj  As in model (2)
FUNCTION i As in model (2)
POOLEDi As in model (2)
11Time-series  cross-section data are usually prone to strong serial  correlation.  The
panel data in this research are no exception, producing  a Durban-Watson  statistic of 0.3 for
the OLS regression based on model  (2).  To  avoid the difficulties  associated  with  serial
correlation in  OLS analysis of panel  data, model  (2)  is summed over time and  is restated in
the usual  way (Hsiao)  in terms of mean  variables over the period  1973-1987  for each
cooperative  i:
(EQ/TA)j  = a +  31PROFIT i +  B 2SIZEi  + B3FIRM RISK,  + 04COMMODITY RISKj  +
+  0 5 FUNCTIONi  +  06POOL, + ui (3)
Here the variables averaged  over time for each  coop are denoted by a superior bar.  The
variables that do not depend  on the time index t in the original model  (2) remain unchanged.
Model (3) is estimated  to determine the effect  of continuous variables  and categorical
variables on the proportion of equity held by a cooperative.  The estimation  is performed
using the General  Linear Models procedure  in the SAS/PC  package.
Results
Table 5 lists the estimated  regression coefficients  for model (3).  For this regression,
the R-square is 0.41  and  the F value is 5.35,  which is significant at the 0.0001  level.  The
dependent  variable  - the mean equity to total assets ratio for each  cooperative  - varies from  a
low of 0.09 to a high of 0.80 with an average of 0.38  across  cooperatives.  This is
statistically indistinguishable from the average  equity to total asset ratio of a large sample of
investor-owned firms  handling comparable  commodities that are reported on an annual basis
in Robert Morris Associates'  Annual Statement Studies.  The corresponding  ratio for these
investor-owned  firms over the same period  1973  to  1987 has an average of 0.38,  same  as
12for the cooperatives  in this study.  The variability, however,  is smaller,  ranging from a low
of 0.20 to a high of 0.53,  due to the smoothing  effect of the larger  sample.
TABLE 5:  Estimated  Coefficients of Regression Model (3): Mean Equity to Total Assets Ratio as
a Function of Profitability, Size,  Firm Risk, Commodity  Risk, Function,  and Pooling
T for HO:  Pr  >  ITI  Std Error of
Parameter  Estimate  Parameter=O  Estimate
INTERCEPT  0.3225  2.95  0.005  0.1093
PROFIT  0.0026  2.31  0.025  0.0011
SIZE  -.0258  -0.32  0.753  0.0816
FIRM RISK  -.0035  -3.35  0.002  0.0010
COMMODITY RISK  0.0014  1.95  0.056  0.0007
FUNCTION  marketing  -.1348  -3.00  0.004  0.0449
mixed  -.0714  -1.42  0.162  0.0503
supply  0.0000
POOLED  nonpooling  0.0235  0.57  0.574  0.0415
pooling  0.0000
R2 = 0.414
Number of observations  = 61
Mean of Dependent Variable  = 0.3756
Minimum of Dependent Variable  =  0.0862
Maximum of Dependent Variable  = 0.8010
The estimation results indicate that the proportion of equity  capital in cooperatives  is
affected by profitability  and commodity  risk,  increasing  with the increase  in both these
factors.  Contrary to expectations,  however,  the estimated  coefficient  on the firm-risk
variable is significantly negative,  which implies that the proportion of equity  is inversely
related to variability  of eanings in cooperatives.
13The size of the cooperatives,  measured  by mean total assets,  is not estimated  to be a
significant factor  affecting a cooperative's proportion of equity.  Although the coefficient is
negative,  as hypothesized,  it is not estimated to be significantly different from zero,
indicating larger cooperatives  do not necessarily  hold a lower proportion of equity capital.
The estimated coefficients  on the function classifications  indicate,  as hypothesized,
that supply cooperatives have higher proportions of equity than cooperatives  acting as
marketing agents.  The estimated  differential  effects  between the supply and marketing
function are significant.  Not unexpectedly,  cooperatives  performing both supply and
marketing functions  fall between the two other functions,  but are not estimated to be
significantly different from supply  cooperatives.
Although the sign of the estimated coefficient  on the pooling variable indicates the
pooling cooperatives  may have lower proportions of equity than nonpooling cooperatives,
the coefficient  is not estimated to be significantly different than zero.  Contrary  to the results
of Sporleder,  Malick,  and Tough, pooling is not found  to affect  a cooperative's  proportion
of equity.  The explicit risk factors  incoportated  in this analysis have apparently  captured the
explanatory power of pooling operations  found  in the previous  research.
Conclusion
Equity holdings among  agricultural  cooperatives  are found to be affected  by risk-
related factors.  The empirical  analysis indicates that the ratio of equity to total assets  is
affected  by a cooperative's  level and variation of profitability,  the commodity  handled,  and
the market function performed.  In contrast,  the proportion  of equity capital  is not found to
be affected  by the cooperative's  size,  or by whether  or not the cooperative operates on a
pooling basis.
14With the exception of one variable, the directions of the estimated  impacts  are as
hypothesized,  with increases  in profitability  and commodity sales risk tied to higher
proportions of equity.  Increases  in earnings variability,  however,  are estimated to have an
inverse relationship  on the proportion of equity.  This result does not conform to theoretical
considerations.  Higher levels of earnings variability are expected to be matched with
higher levels of equity.  The explanation for this surprising result may rest with the
cooperative's  process  of equity accumulation.  Because equity in a cooperative  is almost
exclusively generated through retention of earnings,  the stability of profits affects  a
cooperative's  ability to accumulate  equity.  If the major source of equity is unstable, the
cooperative  may have difficulty accumulating  sufficient equity,  given its inability to raise
equity through the sale of stock.  This hypothesis can be tested in future comparative
research of the factors  affecting the proportion of equity and  the composition of equity
sources  in investor-owned  firms and user-owned  cooperatives.
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